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THE EXTENSION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW YORK:
1783-1905.

T

HERE are several reasons why it should be worth while to
investigate the operation of the most unique of American
governmental institutions in the most important state of the
Union. For one thing, in the person of Chancellor KENT New
York furnished one of the founders of American Constitutional
Law, while at the same time it was KENT's fame that early gave
New York decisions the importance they still retain in great part
in the field of citation, and precedent. Again it was KENT'S influence that inclined the fresh shoot of constitutional jurisprudence in
New York in a conservative direction, so that in the face of the
most complex social and economic conditions that obtain anywhere
in the Union, the New York courts have ordinarily pressed those
doctrines of constitutional law :which have for their purpose the
security of property rights more vigorously than the courts of
almost any other jurisdiction. But on the other hand, finally, with
respect to her written constitution New York has had a normal and
representative history, having had, since 1777, four successive constitutions, each of which has progressively stimulated the extension
of judicial review by increased and more detailed inhibitions upon
legislative action.
l.

STATISTICS

OF

JUDICIAI, REVIEW IN NEW YORK.

The list which I print below1 of cases wherein New York courts
have exercised their constitutional function is based primarily upon
data furnished in the fourth and fifth volumes of LINCOLN'S CoNSTITUTIONAI, HISTORY o:F NEW YoRK, extended and corrected by
direct examination of the reports themselves. The preparation of
such a list raises certain problems, the solution of which will
1

For this list of cases see post pp. 306·313.
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necessarily affect the significance of the results to be obtained from
their consideration, and which, therefore, should be stated at the
outset Should, for example, the decisions of lower courts be
counted or only those of the highest court? Clearly, since there is
often no legal provision by which the constitutional question can be
appealed to the highest court, one must count all decisions which
were in fact final. But suppose that a lower court's pronouncement
of unconstitutionality upon a legislative provision is in principle
reversed in a later case decided by the highest court? 1 still
list the lower court's decision but specifically note that it was
finally overruled,-a result which, however, registers itself in
only six cases.2 And this anticipates, in effect, my answer to
a related question, to-wit: whether, wh,ere a number of decisions
occur more or less contemporaneously and all bearing on the
same legislative measure, they should be reckoned as only
one decision or for their total number. Since it is decisions we
are dealing with primarily, I reckon each as one, provided it was
final, but at the same time I have kept careful account of all cases
of this. sort of duplication. 8 Lastly, this most important question
presents itself : Should decisions setting aside legislative provisions
alone be counted, or also those construing such provisions, with a
view to bringing them into harmony with constitutional requirements? Now, most of the latter sort of cases illustrate the rule
laid down in the early case of Dash v. Van Kleeck, that a statute
may not validly operate "retrospectively" to the impairment of
vested rights,-indeed some of the most important decisions in
support of the doctrine of Vested Rights rest upon this principle.
I have accordingly felt no hesitation in reckoning such .cases, which
I indicate in the list below by an asterisk, as true constitutional'
cases if the language of the court itself iridicates the fact that the
statute was being curtailed in deference to some right thought
to be protected by the constitution. For in sue~ cases, it is obvious,
the constitutional function of the judiciary has operation as truly,
and frequently as decisively, as in cases where the statute is pronounced void aoutrance.
These considerations set forth, I may proceed to summarize the
results shown by the list given below. The list runs from I/'?3 to r905,,
a little better than one hundred and twenty years, and from Rutgers
v. Waddingtoti, in which HAMII.'£ON won his spurs, to Wright v.
Hart, in which the Court of Appeals, going counter to the weight
of-· decision in other states, on the constitutional issue involved, held
2 Nos. 30, 6o, 77, 78, 93•, 145•.

•Attention is drawn to the fact in the text, when it is· materiaL
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void the Bulk Sales Act of 1902.4 In this list are cited 363 cases.
In six of these the decision was in principle later overruled by a
higher court.5 In thirty-one, the great majority of which occurred before the Civil War, the legislative measure involved was
construed but not avowedly set aside. In fifty-seven the decisions
involved the same legislative provision or provisions as some previous case, though it was not r~ted necessarily on the sruiie constitutional grounds as its fellow}' In a number of cases not particularly
noted more than one enactment was under review, while in a
number of others the decision was based on more than one constitutional provision or principle.
More striking results emerge when we proceed to classify these
363 cases chronologically. Thus we find that for more than a
generation after Rutgers v. Waddington, no act of the legislature was
pronounced void by a New York court, and that for more than a
quarter-century none was eyen construed. Indeed, not till l8o2
was a statute attacked by counsel at bar as void, and it was seven
years before such an argument was again addressed to a New York
court. For the whole period of forty-five years during which the
constitution of 1777 was in effect eleven constitutional cases were
decided by the New York courts; in three the statute assailed was
sustained; in three it was curtailed in such a way as not to govern
the case ; in the remaining five it was pronounced void. 7
'
•See Lemieux v. Young, 2n U. S. 48g (1909), and cases there cited.
1 See note 2, supra.
•The following groups of cases involve each the same act or acts: II and 31;
19 and 21; 23 and 24; 27, 29, 33•, 44 and 48--the :Married Women's Property k t
of 1848; 34, 39 and 41-the Free School Act; 35 and 49; 37 and 37•; 45 and 47: SI
and 54-the Anti-Liquor Act of 1855; 61, 64 and 65; 69 and So; '17 and 78; 87, 92, 121
and 122; 115 and 123; 127 and 215; 140 and 741; 153 and 154; 158• and 182; 159 and
242; 161 and 199; 16~ and 214; 165 and 166; 188 and 196; 191 and 792; 193 and 298,
involving the same parties; 193• and 197; 201, 202, 203 · and 212; 245 and 246; 250,
251, 252 :ind 254; 253, 256, 257 and 293; :z66 and 286; 267 and :a74; 269, 279 and 284;
272 and 287; 277, 278 and 327; 277• and 296"; 281 and 294; 290, 309 and 326; 310
and 3n; 322, 323 and 332.
•
'The following is a list of the cases in which, during the period covered by the
first two conetitutions, acts of the legislature were unsuccessfully challenged before New
York courts. After 1846 such case~ become too numerous to list here, but the cita·
tions given in the fourth volume of Lincoln are nearly enough complete, l believe, to
show the approximate truth:
18o7: ·x Holmes v. Lansing, 3 Johns. Cas. 73.
l8o9:
2 Jackson v. Griswold, s Johns. 139·
1812: 3 Livingston v. Van lngen, 9 ib. 506.
1819: 4 Mather v. Bush 16 ib. 233.
1821:
s People v. Foot, lg ib. 58.
1823:
6 Re Oaths of Attorneys, 20 ib. 492;
6• Rogers v. Bradshaw, ib. 735, overturning Bradshaw v. Rogers, ib. 103;
7 ~x parte :McCollum, l Cow. 550.
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The small number of constitutional cases under this first constitution is referred by LINCOLN to the fact that under it "the
Council of Revision, composed of the Governor, the Chancellor, and
the judges of the Supreme Court, passed on all bills before they
became laws," with the result that "laws received a judicial construction prior to their enactment."8 The ~xplanation is at best very
imperfect. The factors of judicial review are three-fold: first,
the bulk of the legislative product; secondly, the scope of the principles which the judges themselves have developed for the evaluation of this product; thirdly, the number and detail of the provisions
in the written constitution restrictive of legislative power. Anterior
to the constitution of I82I, the annual legislative grist in New York
was still small; the courts had not yet perfected the doctrine of Vested
Rights, which with its various ramifications and derivatives is still
1824:

8
9

1825:

IO
II

xz
1826:
1827:
1828:
1829:
1830:
1831:
1833:
1836:
1837:
1838:
1839:
1840:
1841:

x3
I4
15
x6
x7
xS
I9
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
. 32

33
1842:
1843:
1845:

·• .1846:

34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

42
43

44

•Loe. cit.

Murphy v. People, 2 ib. Bxs;
Jackson v. Wood, ib. 8x9;
Barker v. People, 3 ib. 686.
No. R. S. B. Co. v. Livingston, ib. 713;
People ex rel. Israel v. Tibbets, 4 ib. 38+
Jaques v. Marquand, 6 ib. 497.
Vanderbilt v. Adams, 7 ib. 349;
Coates v. N. Y., ib. 585.
Lansing v. Smith, 8 ib. x46;
Candler v. N. Y., I Wend. 493.
Bank of Columbia v. Att'y Gen'l, 3 ib. 588.
Wheelock v. Young, 4 ib. 647.
Beekman v. Saratoga & S. R. Co., .3 Paige 45.
Re Smith, IO Wend. 449.
People v. Rensselaer & S. R. Co., IS Wend. u3.
Bloodgood v. Mohawk & H. R. R. Co., 14 ib. 52, and xB ib. 9;
Frost v. Brisbin, 19 ib. I I.
Dutch Church v. Mott, 7 Paige 77;
Cochran v. Van Sur!ay, 20 Wend. 365.
Perrine v. Striker, 7 Paige 598;
People v. Morrell, 2I Wend. 563.
Thomas v. Leland, 24 ib. 65.
Butler v. Palmer, I Hill 324;
People v. Jenkins, ib. 46g;
People ex reL Lynch v. N. Y., 25 Wend. 68o;
Ex parte Lynch, 2 Hill 45.
Welch v. Silliman, ib. 49I ;
Colt v. People, I Park. Crim. 6II.
Foote v. N. Y. Fire :Qept., s Hill 99.
Duffy v. People, I ib. 355, and 6 ib. 75.
Ingersoll v. Skinner, I Denio 540;
Striker v. Kelly, 2 ib. 323;
Gifford v. Livingston, ib. 38o;
Russell v. N. Y., ib. 46x.
Stocking v. Hunt, 3 ib. 274;
Morris v. People, ib. 38x ;
People v. Huntington, 4 N. Y. Legal Observer 187.
V, +

JUDICIAL REVIEW- IN NEW YORK

the principal foundation of judicial review; and the provisions of
the written constitution directly restricting legislative power were
few. There was, in short, little judicial review because there was
little to base it upon.
From this point on the results may be summarized by decades.
From 1822 to 1830 inclusive, sixteen cases appear to have been
argued before New York courts on constitutional grounds, but in
only one of these was the statute brought into review overturned,
while in a second it was curtailed by construction. From 1831 to
1840 inclusive, fourteen such cases were argued, in four of which
the result was adverse to the statute. From 1841 to 1850 there is·
a considerable expansion of judicial review, due in part to the going
into effect of the constitution of 1846, but in greater part to conflict
between the conservative principles of the courts and the refonn
tendencies of legislation, a conflict which also characterizes the
ensuing decade.9 Thus for the decade from 1841 to 1850, I find
fifty-eight constitutional cases, in eighteen of which the decision
was rendered in favor of the party claiming his constitutional rights ;
while for the decade from 1851 to 1860, the figures are respectively
127 and 34. For the remaining periods I am less confident of th~
accuracy of my statistics show.ing the number of cases argued, ·which
should therefore be taken as approximate only:
Period
1861-70 ........ .
1871-So ••...•...
1881-90 ......... .
1891-1900 ...... .
1901-05 ........•
Total from
beginning ....

Number of Cases Ar- Number of these in
gued on Constitutional which Acts were set
Grounds
aside or curtailed
128
39
251
45
263
49
334
99
65
147
I

345 (Approx.)

363

In short, before the outbreak of the Civil War 225 cases had been
argued before New York courts on constitutional grounds, in sixtyfive of which the court had intervened against the statute; while
since that date more than uoo such cases have been so argued, in
nearly 300 of which _statutes have been set aside. Nor is this the
only clue that the above statistics furnish to the extension of judicial
review in New York in recent years. Of equal significance is the
•See J. Bronson's sarcastic language in Stockton v. Green, 3 Hill 469 (1841). Com·
pare the same justice's ardent defense of the Property Right in Sackett v. Andross,
s ib. 327 (1843).
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varying ratio between the number of cases argued and those in
which the statutory provision under review succumbed to constitutional tests. Ignoring the few sporadic cases before 1822, we
notice that in the nine years between this date and 1830, this ratio
is 8 to I ; that. in the four succeeding decades it shrinks to approximately 3Yz to I; that from 1871 to 1880 it rises to 5 5/9 to I, where
it remains approximately till 189<>; that since this last date it has
fallen to less than 3 to I. The explanation is to be found, I surmise,
in the expansion of constitutional doctrine.
Moreover, the same result is indicated in another way. If the
dates of the cases be compared with the dates at which the legislative provisions reviewed in them were enacted, it will be found that
in recent years the period betwe~ the two is usually somewhat
less than three years. Early cases, on the other hand, arose, on the
average, eight or ten years after the passage of the statute attacked,
and not infrequently the interval was much greater. The explanation
of this phenomenon is to be found, in part at least, in the fact that,
as new constitutional doctrine developed, statutes that had frequently stood on the books for years unchallenged became. tainted with
doubt as to their validity,-that with the lapse of time, new and
more rigorous standards were dr~wn in!o use.10
II.

INTERPrun'ATION OF THE W.RITTEN CONSTITUTION.

As I have before noted, the multiplication in its constitution of
specific prohibitions on legislative power has been one of the principal factors of the extension of judicial review in New :York. I
shall now consider the matter a little more in detail, prefacing only.
that, in what I shall say in this connection, I leave entirely out of
account the doctrine of Vested Rights and its derivatives. ·
A single decision overturning a statute is referable to the constitution of 1777,11 and but six such decisions to the constitution of
1821.12 Under the constitution of 1846, on the other hand, and the
amendments added to it in 1874 and 1876, 108 decisions of this
character were rendered, involving at least one hundred statutory
provisions; while to the constitution of 1894 sixty-eight such· decisions are to be credited in little over a decade, albeit sixteen of
these are to be reckoned as duplicates of others as to the measures
reviewed.
'''010 In this conncctfon, see the interesting testimony of Jnstice Chase in Cooper. T.
'relfair, 4 Dall 13 (1800).
11 No. 7 in Note l, supra. This is always the list referred to in the following notelio
12 Nos. lo, 16, 19, 20, :u, 52.
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But it should also be interesting to see what specific provisions,
particularly of the last two constitutions, have been of greatest importance in this connection. Two stand out preeminent: Article III,
§ § 16 and 18, both of which were carried over to the present constitution from the amended constitution of 1846 without substantial
.change. Under the former of these provisions, which ordains that
"''no private or loc;al bill * * * shall embrace more than one subject" which must be "expressed in the title,'' thirty-fore cases have
been decided overturning thirty-four legislative measures ;13 and
under the latter, which ·inhibits certain types of special legislation
altogether, seventeen cases overturning sixteen measures.14 The
obvious purpose of these provisions is to prevent log-rolling, and in
no other connection has judicial review proved of greater practical
value in New York than in stringently enforcing them!15 Nor is
the objection forthcoming in this sort of case that some great legislative policy, touching important social interests, has been rendered
impossible. The measures overturned under these provisions are
.ordinarily of very limited application, and when they. succumb to
the constitutional test it is not because they were beyond the legislative power to enact at all but merely because they were beyond the
legislative power to enact in that form,-for even the objective of
prohibited special acts may be obtained, if it is otherwise constitutional, by general legislation. Moreover, it is worth noting that the
legislature has gradually learned to accommodate itself to the judicial
view of these; sections, so that, of the fifty-two cases just ref erred
to, only twelve were decided under the constitution of 1894
Next to these two sections the most prolific source of ,decisions
invalidating legislation have been the constitutional provisions which,
beginning with the instrument of 1846, have defined the judicial
system of the state and have assigned the several courts their jurisdiction. Under these sections, which were amplified by amendment
in 186g, and in this f~nn are continued in Article VI of th~ present
.constitution, there have been, during the period covered by this
article, forty-two decisions,--eleven of them d~plicates as to the
enactments reviewed-invalidating acts. The majority of these in-

74,

u Under the constitution of 1846, Nos. 55, 70•,
84, S6, 91, 93, 94, 95, 96, 98,
99, 109, 125, 126, 127, 135. 137. 148, 149. 155. 158, 162, 170, 178, 185, 215,
216; under the constitution of 1894, to 1905, Nos. 220, 231, 262, 273, 302•, 324, 333•.
1' Under the constitution of 1846, as amended in 1874, Nos. 138, 144, 153, 154, 164,
168, 16!), 177, 179, 180, 184•, 213; under the later constitution, to 1905, Nos • .z22, 231,
'247, 289, 297.
15 Some courts regard such provisions as directed only to the conscience of the
legislature, see Reinsch, American Legislatures and Legislative Methods, p. 147ff.
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voke the principle of construction which is made familiar by Marbury v. Madison, that jurisdiction bestowed by the constitution is
neither to be enlarged nor diminished by statute.16 Four decisionsinvolving two different legislative provisions-call into use the
equally familiar principle that a court is possessed of certain inherent
powers and a certain inherent discretion that may not be invaded
by the legislature.17 One decision enforces that interpretation of
the doctrine of the Separation of ·Powers which 'vas first brought
forward in the famous H aybiern case of I792, and which pronounces
void any attempt to foist administrative powers upon the judiciary.18
Another considerable class of decisions-twenty-four in numbersafeguard the rights of localities in the choice of their officials from
what would appear in most cases to have been inadvertent trespasses·
by the legislature.19 With these may be grouped five other decisions,
under the constitution of I846, and involving two distinct enactments, which assert the principle that the qualifications stipulated by
the constitution for voters may not be added to by statute.20 And
with similar logic three other eases support the principle that the
oath of office prescribed by the constitution is an exclusive test.21
Thus we gather that when the constitution deals with a subject, such
subject is put definitely beyond the reach of direct legislative action,
although it may be still more or less affected by legislation regulative
of matters. within legislative control; and the problem before the
courts is to draw the line between these two classes of enactments.
The personal rights-in co.ntradistinction to political rights-that
have exacted the greatest ingenuity from the New York courts in
their behalf are those which I shall consider presently in connection With the development of the doctrine of Vested Rights in this
14 In No. 33, the act overturned . was held to confer judicial power upon a non·
constitutional court. In the following cases the legislature was held to have attempted
to enlarge the territorial jurisdiction 0£ local courts unconstitutionally: us, 123, 146, 194,
2II ; 224, 227 and 228, all involving the same act; 239; 250, 251 and 252, involving the
same act. In 129, 163, 193a, 1971 214, 271 1 272 and 2871 jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court was held to have been curtailed unconstitutionally. In 165 and 1661 both in·
volving the same act, certain appeals to the Court of Common Pleas were held 'to have
been wrongly dispensed with.
1f No. 186; and Nos. 322, 323 and 332 1 all involving the same act.
11 No. 200. Compare In re Cooper, 22 N. Y. 67, where it is said that powers
administrative. in character become judicial· powers when conferred on a court. See
also United States v. Duell, 172 U. S. 576 •
.. Nos. ssa, 69, 8o, 83, 85, 104, III, II6, us, 152•, 156, 232, 235, 236, 240, 258, 264,
282, 302, 303, 305, 3ua, 330, 333. Article VI, § 17, and Article X, § § 2 and 5, of
both constitutions, and Article XII, § 3 of the later one.
~.,..,No. 89; and Nos. 201, 202, 203 and 21:z, all involving the same act.
Article II,
§ I of the constitution of 1846.
n Nos. 205, 296, 307. Article XII, § 1 of the amended constitution of 1846, and
article XIII of the present constitution.
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state. But outside this field, though at some points tangent to it,.
there is that field of rights which may be called the rights of personal security and which is safeguarded by certain constitutional requirements as to the procedure of law enforcement. One of these
requirements is that "no person shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself" ; under this clause three cases
have been decided setting aside as many acts.22 Another requirement is that "excessive bail shall not be required"·; under this one
such case has been decided.23 Another requirement is that "the trial
by jury in all cases in which it has been heretofqre use<j, shall remain inviolate forever"; to this provision eiglit constitutional decisions are referable, though three of them concerned the.same act.241 ·
Finally there is" the general requirement of "due process of law,'"
which, taken in the strictly literal sense of that method of procedure
which was "due," has furnished the basis for eleven cases.reviewing
adversely eight different enactments.25
The construction that has been given the requirement, against
excessive bail by the New York courts demands no. comment. Not
so of the interpretation they give the "self-incrimination" clause.
Stated in the language of one of the cases it runs thus: "No .one
shall be compelled in any judicial or other proceeding against him:;elf, or upon the trial of issues between others, to disclose facts qr
circumstances that can be used against him as admissiOn tending to
prove his guilt or connection with any criminal offense of which
he may then qr afterwards be charged, or the sources from which
or the means by which evidence of its commission or of his connection with it may be obtained."26 Clearly, this is a rather considerable edifice for so slight a foundation. But it mast be admitted
that the New York decisions, which in fact are comparatively re·cent ones, merely reiterate the accepted American doctrine on this
'point.27
22

Nos. 292•, 316, 321. Article I, § 6 of both constitutions.
No. 50. Article I, § 5 of both constitutions.
"'No~. 38, 58, 76, 145•, 234; 269, 279 and 284, involving the same act. Article I, I 2
of both constitutions.
'"Nos. 71, 73, 76; 140 and 141, involving the same act; 237, 243•, 244; 322, 323
and 332, involving the same act.
00 People ex rel. Taylor v. Forbes, 143 N. Y. 219 (1894).
The rule is" reiterated in
People ex rel. Lewisohn v. O'Brien, 176 N. Y. ·253 (1903). See further Lincoln, toe. cit.,
IV, 78-83.
21 See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547, and cases therein cited; also a note
in Harv. Law Rev., XXIV, 570:1. In People v. Rosenheimer, 209 N. Y. n5, lo:z:
N. E. 530 (1913), the N~w York Court of Appeals was much embarrassed by this
enormous and overgrown doctrine. The statute before it provided that any operator
of a motor vehicle who, knowing that injury had been caused by him to property or
persoc, should leave the place without giving his name, residence and license number
21
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Interesting questions are also raised by the interpretation given by
the New York courts to the "trial by jury" and "due process of
law" clauses. In the- former clause the material phrase is "all cases,"
which has been held to mean, "not the mere instances in which it
[trial by jury] had been used," but also "such.new instances and
like cases as might afterwards arise."28 It thus follows that, since
felonies were triable by jury at the time of the adoption of the constitution, new felonies subsequently created, since they belong to
the same genus, must be similarly tried.29 This again is generally
accepted American doctrine. Questionable, on the other hand, is
the proposition for which a recent group of cases is citable, ·that,
because certain kinds of civil claims were ordinarily tried by jury
at the common law, the legislature may not abolish the right of action
thereon.80
Judiciaf construction of.the phrase "que process of law,'' in the
class .of cases now under consideration, boils .down to the more concrete idea of the ordinary procedure of the ordinary courts; to the
idea, in other words, that one against whom a claim is being made
by the state or by· another person is entitled, unless there is usage
to the contrary that antedates the constitutio~, to "his day in court,''
which means, moreover, a court possessed of its constitutional dis-,
cretio~. Thus arbitration pf claims against a city, which in this connection is treated as a private person, may not be foisted upon the
city ;without its consent.81 So, too, an inebriate may not be committed to an asylum upon a mere e~ parte affidavit.82 Again, there
may be no examination out of court of a person .alleged to be in
possession of certain property of another.88 Again, the identity of
alleged second offenders may not be established out of court for
the purpose of lengthening, in accordance with the law, the penal
to the injured party or to a policeman, should be guilty of a felony. In the lower
court this act was pronounced void under article I, § 6. The Court of Appeals, how·
ever sustained the act on the ground that, inasmuch as the legislature might exclude all
motor vehicles from the highways, it could insist that as a condition precedent to the
use thereof, operators of such should waive the constitutional privilege I See also Wig·
more, Evidence, § 2266.
• Wynehamer v. The People, 13 N. Y. 378, 426 (1856).
»The privilege extends, it is elsewhere said, to all offenses indictable 'at the common
law, see No. 58.
*'See Nos. 269, 279 and 284, all involving the same act. In the recent case of
Ives v. So. Buffalo R. Co., 201 N. Y. 271, the same proposition is advanced, and
a~le I, § 1 invoked in support of it.
UNo. 71.
aNos. 76 and 243•.
a Nos. 140 and 141, both involving the same act.
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sentence of such offenders.3 ' Again, a warrant issued by a commissioner has been held not to be due process ;35 also, an act requiring the trial of certain kinds of civil cases on a specific day to
be set in advance by the court.86
These results sometimes diverge from those reached by courts in
other states, but the logic underlying them is familiar and well established. Likewise, the difficulty that the New York courts have
sometimes encountered in distinguishing between a penalty and a
remedy is one that has often caused trouble in other jurisdictions.
Thus the common law sometimes gives ·an aggrieved party, which
may. be the state itself, a remedy enforceable out of court by summary action. <;>n the otJier hand, a penalty may, of course, b~
enforced only iri court. The difficulty is to draw the line between
the two classes of cases, and this the New York courts have not
always done with entire consistency. So, a statute al}.owing owners
to seize and dispose of stock that had trespassed upon their lands
from the highway was at first overturned and then, after some unessential modification, sustained.31 Contrariwise,· a statute allowing
the confiscation, by officers of the law, of fishing. nets in illegal use.
was sustained,38 while a later statute subjecting offending 9ysterboats to the same treatment was set aside.39 Plainly, here is a point
at which conclusive results have not yet been reached.'°
.. No. 237. J. Delehanty's decision, recently reported in the press, questioning the
validity of the identification of second offenders by the finger·mark test may have in·
volved this point.
·
.. No. 2<14.. Nos. 322, 323 and 33:>, involving the same act.
,
11 The first case referred to is No. 73, Rockwell v. Nearing, 35 N. Y. 302 (I866).
The amended statute wa~.sustained in Campbell v. Ev:fns, 45 'N. Y. 356 (I871). Compare this decision with that in :McConnell v. Van .A:erman, 56 Barb. 334 (186sl), where
the amended act is pronounced void.
·
aa Lawton v. Steele, u9 N. Y. 226 (I89o).
•No. 234, Colon v. Lisk, 153 N. Y. I88 (I8g7).
•• The remaining cases assignable to specific constitutional provisions, other than
those conside~ed in connection with the doctrine of Vested Ri~hts, may be claasified thus:
Constitution of I846, art. I, I 9 (Two-thirds bills), Nos. 97, u7; § Io (Lotteries, etc.),
Nos. 209, 2I8; art. III, I 5 (Apportionments), Nos. 59 and 72; art V, § I (Compcnsa·
tion of certain officers, not to be increased or decreased), No. 45; art. VI, § 8 (Right
to practice law), Nos. 23, 24; art. VII, I 3 (State canals), No. Io6; I 12 (Referendum
of indebtedness propositions), Nos. 37, 37•; I I3 (Tax laws), No. n2; art. IX, I I
(Common school fund inviolable), No. Io7. Amendments added in I874. art. III, § 24
of the amended constitution (Against extra-compensation, etc.), No. I32; art. VII, § I4
(Barring claims lapsed by statute of limitations), Nos. I72, I90; art. VIII, § IO· (Against
gratuities and aids by local governments), No. I52. Amendment of I876, art. V, §4 of
the amended constitution (Appointive power of superintendent of prisons), Nos. I7I,
I76. Constitution of I894' art. III, § 28 (Against extra-compensation, etc.), No. 306;
art. V, § 9 (Civil service examinations), Nos. 221, 230; same (Appointive power to civil
service), No. 275; art. VIII, § IO (Against gratuities and aids by local governments),
Nos. 238, 253, 256, 257, 26o, 292, 293; art. XII, § 2 (Referendum of special acts to city
authorities), Nos. 243, 285.
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III.

'tHE DOC'l'RINE 01" VES'l'ED .RIGHTS AND GENERAL
LEGISLA'.l'IVE POWER.

The primary purpose, however, of judicial review and its principal effect upon legislative policies are to be seen only when we
tum to consider it in relation to the doctrine of Vested Rights and
those clauses of the written constlbttion which have come to embody
this doctrine, with the result at once of extending it and rendering
it more flexible. For, as I have shown elsewhere, the doctrine of
Vested Rights is the very matrix of constitutional limitations in this
country, their raison d'etre.41 In no other field, moreover, does the
responsibility of the courts themselves for the development of
judicial review appear so immediate and striking as in this. Yet,
if the responsibility of the courts in this connection is immediate,
that of society at large is mediate and very real. For the process
of constitutional amendment has left the doctrine for the most part
untouched; has left, in other words, its modification and adaptation
to circumstances to judicial discretion. These are conclusions that
hold for practically all jurisdictions in the United States, but they
receive peculiar confirmation and emphasis from New York.
The doctrine of Vested Rights, in its original and primitive form,
is simply the doctrine that the property right is fundamental and
that the legislature cannot, therefore, be deemed to have been given
power, by the act creating it, to impair that right. But, as I have
above indicated, the doctrine has undergone extension and development. To indicate the principal steps of this development in New
York, so far as it has proved restrictive of general legislative power,
is my purpose at this point.
The doctrine of Vested Rights may be said to have been launched
in New York by the decision in the early case of Dash v. Van
Kleeck,4 2 and especially by K~NT's opinion in that case. Here were
established, either directly or by inference, three propositions : first,
that an accrued right of action under tI:ie standing law is a property
right; second, that the common Jaw rule that an ambiguous statutory
provision should not be given a "retroactive" application in a way to
impair vested rights, is of constitutional obligation and extends, furthermore, to unambiguous as well as ambiguous provisions; third,
that special legislation affecting detrimentally the vested rights of
selected persons is void. The basis for the two latter propositions,
in KEN-r's opinion at least, is furnished by the theory elaborated in

.,, ..

.... See Mich. Law Review, XII, 247 ff (1914).
"7 Johns. 477 (1811). But see also Beadlestone v. Sprague, 6 ib. 101 (1810).
Here the results of the doctrine are achieved without the doctrine being avowed,-a
characteristic device of the courts in the early days of judicial review.
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Justice CHASE'S dictum in Calder v. Bull,43 that, under the social
compact, legislative power is an intrinsically limited power, and by
an interpretation of the doctrine of the Separation of Powers supporting this theory. That is to say, legislative power is, in the first
place, a trust in the interest of certain rights, which therefore it
may not transgress; while in the second place, the principle of the
Separation of Powers makes it clear that it is only legislative power
with which the legislature is constitutionally endowed.
For many years the doctrine of Vested Rights rested in New
Yark upon this extra-constitutional basis, and a whole ·series ·of
decisions overturning acts invoke no provision of the written constitution, but only such authority as CHASE'S above-mentioned
dictum, a similar utterance by STORY in Wilkinson v. .Leland, and
certain passages from KENT'S COMMENTARIES." Eventually, however, with the advance, in the late twenties and earlY. thirties, of
the notion of Popular Sovereignty, the opinion came to prevail
among lawyers and judges that, unless an act of the legislature could
be shown to be incompatible with some provision of the written
constitution, it must receive judicial enforcement.45 So, the New
Yark courts were confronted with the dilemma of either dismissing
the doctrine of Vested, Rights or of finding some phrase of the
written constitution capable of. giving it shelter. I say they were
confronted with a dilemma. Yet strictly speaking, this is a misstatement, since, so far as I can dis\:over, it was hardly suggested
that the doctrine of Vested Rights should be made to walk the
plank.46 What was really required, and all ~at was required,
was a certain measure of ingenuity on the part of the judges
in conforming to a new standard of decorum when overturning legislative enactments that wete thought to infract unduly
the property right.
The requisite ingenuity was forthcoming,
but as I have told the story elsewhere in detail, I need not
do so here.u Suffice it to say that the decision of the new
Court of Appeals in the case of Westervelt v. Gregg,4 8 in
3 Dall. 386 (1798).
Nos. z, 3, 9 1 18, 26, 32, 36. But along with these should be reckoned certain
transitional cases, in which both extra-constitutional considerations and the "due process"
clause furnish the basis of the decision: Nos. :27, 29, 33•, 42, 44, 51.
a See Senator Verplanck's words on this point in Cochran v. Van Surlay, 20 Wend.
365 (1838). In Grant v. Courter, 24 Barb. 232, 237 (1857), the court pronounces the
idea that there are extra-constitutional restrictions on legislative power "fancifnl." See
also Benson v. the Mayor, ib. 248; People v. I!raper, 15 N. Y. 532 (1855); Sill v.
Corning, ib. 549, and the cases cited below. The original statement of the established
view is J. Iredell's opinion in Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386. Today it is as impossible to
make the orthodox lawyer believe that courts have ever set aside statutes on other than
strictly constitutional grounds as it is to make an orthodox Jew eat pork.
a

ff
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1854, whereby the Married Women's Property Act of 1848 was
confined, in the case of existing marriages, to acquisitions of property
subsequent to the passage of the act, and its even more notable
decision in Wynehamer v. the People/ 9 whereby the Anti-Liquor
Act of 1855 was set aside, were both based exclusively on the "due
process of law" clause, which was thus rendered an independent
limitation on substantive legislation.
By the Civil Wat, then, the doctrine of Vested Rights had been
brought in New York within the fold of the written constitution
and so placed beyond the criticism of the most meticulous. Its benefits, on the other hand, were still confined to a relatively narrow
range of rights: to an owner's valuable control of his tangible prolh
erty ;fi 0 to s&vitudes and easements approximating to a right of ownership ;u to litigated claims redeemable in money ;H to accrued rights
of action,58 and to the rights protected by the "obligation of contracts" clause of the United States Constitution.H Since the addition of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, however, the scope of rights protected by the "due process"
clause, not only. of the Amendment itself but of any constitution
in which the clause occurs, has been tremendously expanded by the
action of the courts in undertaking to construe the term "liberty".u
For there can be no doubt' that anterior to the .Civil War
and for some years after it, "liberty" meant only such freedom of
action as the ordinary law allowed and was subject, therefore, to
curtailment substantially at legislative· discretion. 58 The later doctrine, which was the outcome of debates in Congress on the rights
of the ·freedmen- immediately following the War, was first foreshadowed judically in the dissenting opinions of Jus.tices Fmr,n~nd
BRADr,tv in the Slaughter House Cases5 7 in 1873. Ten years later
the two justices had an opportunity to reiterate their view in concurring opinions in the case of The Butcher's Union Co. v. The Cres"An interesting exception to this statement is, however, afforded by J. Cowen's
opinion in Butler v. Palmer, 1 Hill 324 ('%841).
"See my articles in the Harv. I,aw Rev., XXIV, 366 ff. and 46o ff.
" 12 N. Y. 202•
.. 13 ib. 378.
00 See e. g. the Anti· Liquor Act cases.
a See the Married Women's :Property Act cases.,
0 No. 42.
a Nos. 2, 3, 32, 70, 88. Contra: C. J. Savage in People v. Livingston, 6 Wend.
526, 530·1 (1831). The established view is well stated in 86 App. Div. 335 (1903).
.. V d. infra. And see generally my article cited in note 41, supra.
See my article in Mich. I.aw Rev., VII, 643 ff.
H The reference is note 41, supra.
See also the argument of counsel on both sides
in People v. Toynbee, 20 Barb. 168 (1855).
GT 16 WaIL 36.
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cent City Co.,~ 8 and from this plane it was lifted two years later, by
the New York Court of Appeals, into the full dignity of established
doctrine, in the case of In re Jacobs.~ 9 But not till twelve years later
was the new doctrine accepted by the United States Supreme Court.
This occurred in the case of Allgeyer v. Louisiana,60 in which the
spokesman of the Court was Justice PECKHAM, who had been a·
member of the bench that decided In re Jacobs, and.its fellow, People v. Marx. 61
Dash v. Van Kleeck, Wynehamer v. The People, and fore Jacobs
mark, then, the principal stages by which the doctrine of Vested
Rights was expanded in New York to the modem concept of D~e
Pi:ocess of I;aw; the obverse of which is the pn;sent-day judicial
theory of the Police Power. Within this field, moreover, the New
York courts were doing constructive, if not entirely original, work,
and their results, modified to some extent by contributions from other
jurisdictions, have today become the most important part of the
constitutional jurisprudence of the country. Indeed, from the point
of view of the primary aim of constitutional law, that of delimiting
the rightful inter£erence of government with private rights, they
comprise constitutional law.
And this signifies that the statistical phase of the matter, to wµich
we now tum for a moment, should also illus~rate like developments
in other jurisdictions. The statistics showing the influence of Dash
v. Van Kleeck and the principles therein enunciated are imperfect
until we come to consider those more specialized p9wers of the state~
Taxation and Eminent Domain, as we shall do immediately. Even
so, of the twenty-four decisions which, before I855, overturned or
curtailed legislative acts not thus classifiable and which were rendered without reference to the federal ·Constitution, one-half followed
in the wake of this case.62 On the other hand, the effect of the
tra.nsference of the doctrine of Vested Rights from its somewhat
precarious footing on the theory of the social compact to the "due
process" clause is not at once so apparent. Thus, in the course of
the thirty years between Westervelt v. Gregg and In re Jacobs only
A III

U. S. 746.

u93 N. Y. 98.
eo 165 U. S. 578.
u 99 N. Y. 377.
82

See note 44, supra.
ea Those invoking the clause are Nos. 48, SI~ 54, n, 78, 120. Those which omit
mention of the clause are 70, 88, Ior, u4, 148. It would seem that the period fcillowing
the Dred Scott Decision and the bitter criticism which it evoked was a period of judicial
modesty. See, e. g. the words of J. Wright in Met. Board of Excise v. Barrie, 34 N.
Y. 657, 668, criticizing certain "inconsiderate 4icta" in the Wynehamer decision and
warning against setting "the judicial power above the legislative."
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eleven decisions assert the paramountcy of vested rights to the legislative measures involved, and five of these do so without reference
to the ·constitutional provision.63 But, in all these cases save one
the act is set entirely aside, whereas in eleven of the twelve
or thirteen cases based on Dash v. Van Kleeck, the act was
merely denied what was termed "retroactive" operation. The decision in the Jacobs case, however, introduces a new epoch in judicial
review in New York; and in the twenty years between that case
and Wright v. Hart,64 forty-seven decisions overturned nearly as
many acts on the basis of the "due process" clause,il5 while one other
set aside the statute in review as "oppressive,'' 66 and yet another
strangely invokaj. the Fifth Amendment of the federal Constil;ution.67 Such is the stimulus of a new point of view!
IV.

THE DOC'l'RINE OB' VESTED RIGHTS IN RELATION TO EMINENT
DOMAIN AND TAXATION.

This concludes the story of. the development of constitutional
limitations on general legislative power in New York, except for
those limitations that attach themselves to the federal Constitution.
But as I have already indicated, the full effect of the doctrine of
Vested Rights is to be appreciated only by canvassing also the
restrictions that have been built up, partly by judicial decision,. partly
by specific constitutional provision, about the powers of taxation and
eminent domain.
Interestingly enough, the constitution of I777 contained no mention of eminent domain. In the case of Gardner v. Newburgh, 68
however, which was decided in I8I6, C4ancellor ~NT held that the·
state possessed the power as an incident of sovereignty but that its·
exercise was governed by two fundamental limitations: first, that
private properly could be thus appropriated for a "public purpose
only," and secondly, that the owner must receive full cop:ipensation.
The requirement of "just compensation" was soon after ,embodied in.
the constitution of I82r,' from which it has since-been' transferred
successively to the constitutions of I846 and r8g4 ;69 ·while in en.. 182 N. Y. 330 (1905).
11 In the following cases vested rights are involved: •Nos. 158•, 159, 176, 182, 185•,

~·~~~~~~~·~~~~~~-ill

these Nos. 263, 266, 286 and 328 assert the right to a reasonable remedy where property
rights are involved; see 128 N. Y. 190. In the following cases, the derived definition
of "h"berty'' furnishes the basis of the -decision: Nos. 160, ~61, 174. 217, 241, 249, 274,
28~ 1 , 290, 294, 295, 299, 300, 309, 310, 3II, 315, 317, 319, 320, 325, 326, 329, 334, 335·
'""No. 283.
ftNo. 267.
.
18 2 Johns. Ch. 162.
9 Art. I, § 6, which is largely taken from Amendment V of the federal constitution.
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forcement of it there had occurred, within the period considered in
this article, twenty-two decisions involving twenty different enactments.70 The same constitutional clause, moreover, stipulates
for a "public use" of the property thus taken. Even so, th!! question
still remained whether this was a judicially enforceable limitation,
whether, in other words, the judiciary was entitled to oppose its test
of a "public use" to that of the legi_slature. The implication of
Gardner v. Newburgh, carrying with it the great weight of KENT'S
authority, was plainly affirmative, as was also that of the oft-quoted
maxim-dating at least from CoKE-that "property cannot be taken
from A and given to B without A's consent." 71 Nevertheless, in the
earliest case in which the investiture of a railroad corporation with
the power of eminent domain was assailed before the courts, the
court manifested great reluctance to concede the presence of a
constitutional issue.72 But this attitude did not long endure. In
later cases the building of railroads, albeit by private corporations,
was pronounced a "public purpose," but because the furnishing of
transportation was traditionally a public function ;73 while in Albany
Street Matter, n which was decided in 1834, an act was set aside
which gave a municipal corporation the power, in opening a street,
to acquire the whole of an owner's lot, though only part of it was
required for the street, and to apply the remainder to private uses.75
Thus was judicial review clearly established in this class of cases on
extra-constitutional foundations; while in Taylor v. Porter,16 decided by Justice BRONSON in 1843, the doctrine was transferred tQ
the "due process" clause; and altogether eleven cases have first and
last vindicated the judicial view of "public use" against the legislative
Yiew. 77 Meantime, there had been inserted in the constitution of
1846 certain requirements for the ascertainment of compensation
in eminent domain cases, which are repeated in the constitution of
1894 and upon which tWelve decisions overturning acts have been
based.78 Later still, in consequence of the development of a similar
doctrine in the ease of special assessments, the courts have laid down
the requirement that before private property can be appropriated by
the state the owner is entitled to a notice and a hearing. This doc0
' Nos. 4, rs•, 28, 45, 46, 47, 56, 79, 109•, 139, 159, 164, 193, 204, 206, 207, 242, 255,
261, 276, 298, 313.
n This maxim was invoked by a Massachusetts magistrate in the 17th century against
a town vote, see present writer in Mich. Law Rev., IX, 105.
'12 Beekman v. Saratoga & S. R. Co., 3 Paige 45 (1831).
n Bloodgood v. Mohawk & H. R. R. Co., 18 Wend. 9 (1837), is the leading case.
"rr Wend. 148. Sec also Nos. 13 and I4- In all this class of cases the "A to B"
maxim plays an important part.
•
'"Amendments have at various times been offered to the constitution to give munici·
palities the power denied by the decision in Albany St. matter, but always without avail.
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trine, which is asserted in four comparatively recent cases, is referred'
to the "due process" clause.7 D
The taxing power came within the radius of the doctrine of
Vested Rights, both in New York and elsewhere, at a comparatively
late date. This is partly due to the fact, no doubt, that it was
precisely for th~ purpose of raising revenue that legislatures were
first called into existence, and that consequently an unhampered
legislative discretion in this field of power was very ancient. As
Chief Justice MARSHAI.I, put it in McCulloch v. Maryland, 80 "The
power to tax involves the power to destroy,"-words which have
frequently arrested the judicial arm. Furthermore, the power to
tax is ordinarily granted the state legislature without other specification, so that the written constitution does not furnish convenient
pegs upon which to hang newly elaborated doctrine, as in the case
of the eminent domain power. The result is that the taxing power
remains to this day a power little amenable to judicial construction.81
None the less, there are two principles \vith which the legislature
must comply in New York if its 'tax measures are to survive judicial
scrutiny. The first is the today widely accept~d, though rarely enforce~ doctrine, which has been carried over from the law governing
eminent domain, that a tax must be for a "public purpose." When
the Court of Appeals was first confronted with this doctrine in 1856
it flatly rejected it.82 But twenty years later, in Weismer v. Doug-.
las, 88 which involved an act authorizing a village to issue bonds for
the benefit of a private manufacturing concern, the court reconsidered its earlier position; and altogether eight cases .in which enactments were set aside have invoked more or less directly the "public
p)lrpose" doctrine in the perio!l we are investigating.M Today,_ how-·
Te 4 Hill 140, in which an act providing for the laying out of a private road was
disallowed. The power thus denied the legislature was specifically granted in the con•"
stitution of 1846, art. I, I 7.
tt Nos. n, 13, 14, 17, 22, 31, 91, 128, 139, 157, 195. See note 74, supra.
,. Nos. 40, 43, 68, 100, n9, 130, 142, 184b, 207•, 233, 268, 270. Art. I, § 7 of
both constitutions.
., Nos. ,1S3, 195, 219, 285 •
., 4 Wheat. 316 (1819).
'
01 Observe the court's floundering in McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27 (1904).
12 In Guilford v. the Supervisors of Chenango C'ty, 13 N. Y. 143. See also dicta in
Thomas v. I,eland, 24 Wend. 65 (1840), and Clarke v. Rochester, 24 Barb. 446 (1857)."
See also the cases cited in note 45, supra, from the same volume and from IS N. Y.
In these cases the legislature's discretion in taxation is stated to be that of Parliament.
83 64 N. Y. 92 (1876).
Kent's theory of taxation was the quid pro quo theory, 2
Comms. 332. From this theory the doctrine of Public Purpose is a logical deduction,
foi;,Jt the party paying the tax is to get his due retnrn it must be as a member of the
pub?ic. The quid pro qua theory is also adopted by the court in Gordon v. Carnes,
47 N. Y. 6o8 (1872). and Wilson v. N. Y., 4 J;:. D. Smith 675 (1855).
"'Nos. 90, 125•, 238, 26o and 280 are directly to the point. In Nos. n3, 133, and 134,
acts compelling the issuance of bonds to create a bonus for railway companies were
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ever, the doctrine is practically nugatory. For it had never proved
effective except to check gratuities by local governments, and these
are now specifically forbidden by the constitution of 1894.85
The otner principle to which I referred above as governing the
taxing power in New York is the principle first laid down in Stuarl
'v. Palmer,86 that, in connection with special assessments, notice and
an opportunity to be heard are essential to "due process of law."81
This requirement invalidated acts in seven cases within our
period.8s 811
V.

NEW YORK COURTS AND THE FEDERAL CONSTIT:UTION.

Finally, we should consider briefly a group of decisions resting in
whole or in part upon some clause of the federal Constitution or
upon the supremacy of federal law. Leaving out of account the
cases in which the final clauses of the first section of the Fourteenth
Amendment were brought to the support of the "due process"
clause of the state constitution, there were, in the period here under
overturned: the state cannot make contracts for the individual In No, 125 a municipal

tax is restricted to the locality.
15 See

note 40, supra.
88 74 N. Y. 183 (1878).

11 An earlier difficulty encountered in the case of special assessments was that they
violated the principle that a tax must be "a public tax upon principles of just equality,"
J. Barculo in People ex rel. Post v. Brooklyn, 6 Barb. 209 (1849), citing 2 Kent's
Comms. 332. The learned judge proceeds to argue that either the benefit from such
assessments is public or it is not. In the latter case they are not 'taxes, in the former
the public sbould bear the burden. The assessment in review is- accordingly set aside
as violative of the "due process" clause, and an earlier case, Livingston v. the Mayor,
8 Wend. 85, is overruled. Barculo's decision is in tum overruled in People ex rel
:Griffin v. Brpoklyn, 4 .N. Y. 419 (1851); and in Guilford v Cornell, 18 Barb. 615, it is
asserted that the "due process" clause has no application to the taxing power.
15 Nos. 136, 167, 188•, 191, 192, 223, 269•.
19 The doctrine that the legislature may not delegate its power, which was first
launched as a judicially enforceable principle of constitutional law in 1847, in the case
of 'some local option laws (see Rice v. Foster, 4 Harr. 479, and Parker v. Comm., 6 Pa.
St. 507). has never had any great influence in New York. It was first brought forward
in this jurisdiction in connection with the Free School Act of 1849, which by its own
terms was to become "a law" upon its approval· by the people at, a general election.
In Johnson v. Rich, 9 Barb. 68o (1851), the act was none the less sustained by J.
Johnson, who expressed an uncomplimentary 'Opinion of the Delaware and Pennsylvania
decisions above cited. But in succeeding cases, listed supra as Nos. 34. 39 and 41, the
School Act was pronounced void on the basis of the new doctrine-new, that is, as a con·
stitutional restriction. A tittle later the same principle was again invoked successfully
in People ex rel. McSpedon v. Stout, 23 Barb. 349 (1856), where was overturned
an act providing for the submission of certain charter provisions to the voters of New
York City. A referendum of such measures to the municipal authorities is today pro·
vided for by the constitution itself, art. XII, I 2. In recent years the ~cw York
courts have had no difficulty in sustaining legislative delegations of broadly discretionary
powers to administrative bodies. See especia!IY, Cooper v. Schultz, 32 How. Pr. 107 (1866)
and Trustees v. Saratoga Gas, etc. Co., 191 N. Y. 123 (1908).
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survey, fifty-five such cases, to-wit: twenty-three cases invoking the
"obligation of contracts" clause ;90 thirteen cases invoking the "commerce" clause ;91 six cases condemning ex post facto acts ;92 four
cases in which the act involved was held to infract the admiralty
jurisdiction of the United States ;93 two cases in which the treaty
or commercial rights of Indians were held to have been invaded,9 '
and four cases in which the treaty rights of aliens were sustained
as against conflicting legislation ;95 two cases involving tax measures,
one of which was held void as constituting a tax on imports,06 under
the principle established in Brown v. Maryland, 91 and the other of
which was set aside for taxing the shares of national banks,98 contrary to the rule laid down in McCitlloch v. Maryland and Weston
v. Charleston;99 and lastly, one case concerning the rendition of
fugitive slaves,100 and one concerning the rendition of fugitives from
justice.101
In interpreting the "obligation of contracts" clause the New York
courts have never had any trouble making it a supplemental basis
for the doctrine of Vested Riglits. Indeed the way to this consummation was early pointed out by the federal Supreme Court itself.
Thus in Fletcher v. Peck,1° 2 in which the protection of the clause is
extended in the most unwarrantable fashion to public land grants,
MARSHAL!, made -a bold attempt to grapple the whole doctrine of
Vested Rights to the federal Constitution; and in the Dartmouth
College case,1°3 in which corporation franchises were accorded the
same protection, a still more impalpable logic· prevails.10' Many
of the New York decisions, accordingly, in which enactments are
disallowed under this clause, are easily classified by reference to
federal precedents. A single early case105 is based squarely on
Fletcher v. Peck, which, however, is also cited in cases where it does
See notes 102·n6, infra.
01 See notes u7·26, infra.
"Nos. 61, 64 and 65, involving the same act; Nos. 67, 173, 288•
.. Nos. 87, 92, 102, 121.
"' Nos. 63, 210 •
.. Nos. 216•, 217, 277•, 296••
.. No. 81 •
.. 12 Wheat. 419 (1827).
oaNo. 108.
• 2 Pet. 449 (1829). The disability of the state with respect to national bank shares
is largely removed by § 5219 of the Revised Statutes, in which connection sec Van
Allen v. the Assessors, 3 Wall. · 573.
00

100 No. 14101No. no.
,.._.. 6 Cr. 87 (1810).
1D1 4 Wheat. 518 (1819).
1 0. I have dealt with the subject at length in a study not yet published.
1 "'No. 6.
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not furnish the principal ground of the dec~sion ;108 three comparatively recent cases107 illustrate the rule established by the Dartmouth
College case; three early cases directly invoke the principle upheld
in Sturges v. Crowninshield,108 in which the original intention of the
clause finds expression ; three other cases reiterate the rule established in Bronson v. Kinzie,1° 9 that the law of remedy under which
they are made constitutes a part of the obligation of private contracts; and two more enforce the extension of this rule in Von
Hoffman v. Quincy110 to the case of municipal bonds. On the other
hand, in a number of decisions the New York courts have felt free
to take a line of their own in applying this clause. Thus, in three
of the cases in which the Married Women's Property Act was restricted to subsequent acquisitions of property in the case of existing
marriages, the proposition was advanced that marriage is a contract
within the meaning of the federal Constitution ;111 again, in another
case a license to sell liquors is treated as a contract ;112 while in two
others an award of damages-in one case, a judgment for breach
of contract-is treated is a contra,.ct.1111 None of these positions is
today tenable, nor would they probably be so regarded by the Court
of Appeals. And questionable are two other decisions in this field,
both comparatively recent. In the' earlier ope11& it was held by the
Supreme Court that, where property was taken for a public use on
certain conditions, the legislature could not abrogate these. In the
100 See especially Kent's argument in Gardner v; Newburgh, cited supra, where it
is suggested that the federal case supports the proposition that the power of eminent
domain may be exercised for a "public purpose only." The argument is further elabo·
rated in 2 Kent's Comms. 340. See also the statement by Chancellor Walworth in
Cochran v. Van Surlay, 20 Wend. 365, 371, that Fletcher v. Peck protects "rights vested
under executed contracts" I In other words, the "obligation" clause is made to do the
work later cast on the "due process" clause.
• 01 Nos. 176, 267, 270.
108 4 \Vheat 117 (1819). The New York cases are Nos. s, 8, is.
100 I How. 319 (1840), followed in New York by the decisions in Nos. 25, 57, 181.
11• 4 Wall. 535.
The New York cases are Nos. 103 and 150.
111 Nos. 27, 33•, 44- A ·dictum of Story's in his concurring opinion in the Dartmouth
College case supports the idea, which is decisively rejected in Maynard v. Hill, 125

u. s.

190.

.

No. n.
112 Nos. 7S a~d 208. In the latter case, an award of damages made by a city with
statutory authority is stated to have the effect of a judgment and to constitute a con•
tract the obligation of which is impaired by an act materially abridging the means of
its enforcement. In Dash v. Van Kleeck the theory is developed by J. Spencer that,
immediately a judgment is rendered against a party, "there then * * * arises a contract
against the party adjudged to the sum of money in favor of him to whom it is awar\led."
From this it follows that a legislative act annulling a judgment is void under art. I, § to
of the federal constitution, which thus supports the principle of the Separation of Powers
in forbidding legislative interferences with judicial decrees. 7 Johns. 477,' 489.
11• No. t84112
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later one,115 it was held by the Appellate Division that an act prohibiting the disposal of garbage by specified methods in the borough
of Brooklyn was invalid as to an existing corporation carrying on
this business under a contract with the city, in a way that did not
constitute a nuisance.116
But while the New York courts have shown a somewhat excessive zeal, perhaps, in pressing the "obligation of contracts" clause
as a restriction Q11 the legislative power of the state, this is not at
all the case with their application of the "commerce" clause. Indeed, it was not till 1875 that a local court ever set aside a New York
statute as transgressing this clause, though the federal Supreme
Court had before this date set several of them aside.111 Nor is the
explanation far to seek. It is to be found in New York City's commercial situation in relation to the rest of the country and the
peculiar local problems to which this frequently gave rise.118 For
this reason the New York courts 'W'ere reluctant for many years to
recognize the dogma of the excl}lsiveness of Cong;ress' power under
this clause, with the result that their decisions were more than once
reversed by the United States Supreme Court. Following Henderson v. New Y ork,119 however, three statutes were promptly set aside
by New York courts as trespassing on power reserved to Congress.120
But even more pronounced was the effect of the federal Court's:
decision in Leisy v. H arden,121 which for the first time applied the
"original packag_e" doctrine in the field of interstate commerce.
Between 1893 and 1905, seven decisiOns setting aside four acts were
based on this precedent,122 which, it may be surmised, was the more
favorably regarded because of the support it lent the new-found·
doctrine of Liberty.128 Meantime, however, in Plumley v. Massachusetts,m the federal Supreme Court had virtually abandoned the,
logic of its earlier decision, the benefits of which it now became
:111No. 283•.
:111 Ct Buffalo East Side R. Co. v. Buffalo St. R. Co. tu N. Y. 132 (1888); Manigault
v. Springs, 195 u. s. 473 (1905); and Hudson Water Co. V• McCarter, 209 u. s. 349, 357.
ur C."bbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824), with which compare Kent's decision in
Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. 507 (1812); the Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283 (1849),
with which compare New York v. ;Miln, u Pet. 102 (1837); and Henderson v. N. Y.,
92

u. s.

259 (1875).

Particularly the problem of disposing of hordes of immigrants, especially in the
days before federal inspection had been sufficiently developed.
:ut See note u7, supra.
... See Nos. 122, 143, 147, 187. The last two involve the same act.
:111

,. ~ 135

u. s. 100 (1890).

'122Nos. 199, 218•, z48; and 277, 278, 308, 327, all involving the same act.
ua No. 248 bears out this suggestion. See also Nos. 241 and 291 in the same con·
nection.
"' 155 U. S. 461 (1894).
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anxious to confine to dealers in liquor and cigarettes. Following the
new clue, the New York Court of Appeals in 1905, in. the case of
People ex rel. Silz v. Hesterberg,1~ 3 upheld an act forbidding the
sale during the closed season of certain game birds even when imported into the state from abroad, and was sustained, on appeal,
by the United States Supreme Court.126 It, therefore, appears that
a comparatively liberal formula has today been arrived at for adjusting the claims of the state's police power as against the exclusive
power of Congress under the "commen;e" clause, and that this
formula has been finally accepted by the local courts. St!ll more
recently the Court of Appeals has shown itself prepared to ratify
a similar adiustmentobetween the contesting claims of the police
power and the doctrine of Liberty that attaches to the "due
process" clause.121

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

From !840 on, judicial review became a considerable factor of
constitutional government in New York. From that date· till the
Civil War there were probably more statutes invalidated in New
York on constitutional grounds than in all the other states 'of the
Unioh combined. J3ut the great extension of judicial review in New
Yark, as in other states, has taken place since 1870. This has been
due, first, to the increase in the legi~lative product; secondly, to the
greater detail of state constitutional provisions goveming.legisla:tive
power; thirdly, to the d~velopment of constitutional doctrine.
Those features of constitutional doctrine which have been most
material in bringing about the extension of judicial review in New
Yark may be summarized thus:
l. The principal assumption underlying the construction which
the New York courts have made bf the written constitution of
the state is that of the completeness of this document and, therefore, of the exclusiveness of its provisions with reference to any
matter with which it specifically deals. By this assumption-for it
is hardly an explicit dogma-the differentiation of constitutional provisions from statutory enactments has been maintained, and the
prerogative of the people in amending the constitution has been upheld against the clainis of Legislative Sovereignty.
2. A secondary and more or less corollary doctrine which the
New Yark courts, in common with the courts of other jurisdictions, have manipulated-though, agaill, more by implication than
HS

184 N. Y. 126.
U. S. 31 (1908).

""2U

= See

especially the recent cases of People v. the Klinck Packing Co.,

121, and Heim v. McCall, ib. 629.
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by explicit assertion of it-is the doctrine that any constitutional
office carries with it certain intrinsic functions and a certain intrinsic discretion in the discharge of these functions. Reinforced by
a particular interpretation of the doctrine of the Separation of
Powers, this doctrine has supported judicial independence against
Legislative Sovereignty, and has kept the power of appointment from
slipping into the hands of the legislature.128
3. But the heart and soul of constitutional limitations in New
York, thanks especially to Chancellor KENT, has been the doctrine of
Vested Rights. The first deposit of this doctrine was that principle
of statutory construction which forbids any "retroaction" of statutes,
that is, any operation disturbing property rigltts. Disguised as an interpretation of the doctrine of Separation of Powers, the doctrine of
Vested Rights also early ruled out, except in carefully defined cases,
special legislation dealing with the vested rights of named parties.
Again, it is the doctrine of Vested Rights which, in. the more definite
form of the ancient gnome that "Property may not be taken from A
and given to B without A's consent," that underlies the doctrine of
Public Purpose, both as a limitation on the eminent domain power
and-in which relation it was established at a comparatively late
date---on the taxing power.
4. The New York courts also did constructive work of an im-.
portant character in utilizing the "due process of law" clause as
a safe vehicle for the doctrine of Vested Rights.129 The initial
motive of this step was to meet the criticism of those who
held that the will of the legislature should prevail unless in
contravention of the written constitution: its final result has been
the entire transformation of constitutional law in some of its most
important phases. For once the "due process" clause was applied
to substantive legislation of a general character, the term "liberty"
in it became eventually drawn into construction, as well as the term
"property," and the outcome of this development, in connection with
which New York's courts again playeq a leading and decisive role,
was a tremendous and well-nigh revolutionary extension of judicial
review.
5. But if judicial review has been extended to new and important fields, it has, by the same token, been liberalized. Before
the Civil War, judicial review was governed, in New York as elsewhere, by the general theory that certain kinds of legislative action
us See Nos. 7, 58•, 171, 176, 240, 275, 333.
''•=In Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N. Y. 183 (1878), the "due process" clause is charac·
terized as "the most important guaranty of personal rights to be found in the federal
or state constitution. .It is," the court continues, "a limitation upon arbitrary. power
and is a guaranty against arbitrary legislation."
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were prohibited absolutely and that certain other kinds-taxation,
for instance-were allowed absolutely.180 Today constitutional limitations upon state power, when it does not invade the field of national
power, are qualified more and more by a general allowllnce for the
"police power,'' with the result that they tend to dissolve and merge
into· the judicial view of the "reas.onable" requirements of the
case.1a1
The extension of judicial review in New York must be deemed.
to have taken place, not only by popular allowance, but with popular approval. In all the changes that have been made since the
beginning in New York's constitutional arrangements, few attempts
have been made till a very recent date to curtail judicial review or
to set aside or "modify any of its doctrines.182 On the contrary,
new provisions have ::igain and again been added to the constitution
which were designed to restrict legislative power and which the
courts were relied upon to enforce.
·
·
Most important among. such provisions are certain ones, w:hich
like Article III, § § I6 and IS, have for their purpose, not the curtailment of legislative discretion in the choice and development of public policies, but the rendering impossible of certain legislative mal-·
practices, like log-rolling in its various forms. In ·no other field can
judicial review perform a greater service than in the rigorous enforcement of such provisions; and it may be suggested that,· with
the growing tendency on the part of courts to abandon the impracticable notion of fundamental and indefeasible rights of "liberty"
and "property," local judicial review will become confin~d to the performance of this modest but most useful task. Meantime, two reforms should be instituted in the practice of local judicial review:
the prompt and sure appeal of all constitutional cases for final decision by the highest state court, and the intervention of the attomeygeneral in ,all such cases.
·
As in the parallel ,case of the Confessional, judicial review has
from the first be~n manipulated by two schools, the Laxists and
See my article cited in note 4r, supra.
For a broad definition of the Police Power in relation to the "due process"
clause, see J. Andrews' opinion in Bertholf v. O'Reilly, 74 N. Y. 509, with which com·
pare J. Werner's decision in the Ives case, 201 N. Y. 271. In the latter case the court
plays tricks with its own logic. It starts out by defining the Police Power as extending
to the promotion of "the general welfire," but presently drops this term out, and then
sets aside the act before it as not a real health measure I 'Compare also People v. Ber·
berrich, 20 Barb. 224 (1855) and Metropolitan Board of Excise v. Barrie, 34 N. Y. 657
(1866), where the Police Power is broadly defined, with the Wynehamer case, r3 N. Y.
378 (1856), and Coe v. Schultz, 47 Barb. 64 (1866), where the emphasis is on private
rights. The rise and development of what may be called the Doctrine 'of the Police
Power before the Civil War I have investigated in another study not yet published.
132 See notes 75 and 76, supra. The doctrine of the Ives case has since been virtually
disallowed, so far as the state constitution is concerned, by a recent amendment.
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the Rigorists. New York judges have often been in the fore
rank of the latter school. Yet even in New York "laxism" is today
winning out-if slowly, yet surely. And this signifies that the time
is at hand when, even in this conservative jurisdiction, point of view
will be more potent than precedent in fixing the judicial application
of constitutional restrictions.
EDWARD

Princeton, New Jersey.

s. CoR.WIN.
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